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GOOD LIVES: PROLEGOMENA * 
By LAWRENCE C. BECKER 
A philosophical essay under this title faces severe rhetorical challenges. 
New accounts of the good life regularly and rapidly turn out to be vari-
ations of old ones, subject to a predictable range of decisive objections. 
Attempts to meet those objections with improved accounts regularly and 
rapidly lead to a familiar impasse-that while a life of contemplation, or 
epicurean contentment, or stoic indifference, or religious ecstasy, or cre-
ative rebellion, or self-actualization, or many another thing might count 
as a good life, none of them can plausibly be identified with the good life, 
or the best life. Given the long history of that impasse, it seems futile to 
offer yet another candidate for the genus" good life" as if that candidate 
might be new, or philosophically defensible. And given the weariness, 
irony, and self-deprecation expected of a philosopher in such an impasse, 
it is difficult for any substantive proposal on this topic to avoid seeming 
pretentious. 
Unfortunately, it is only the effort to contribute to a detailed, defensi-
ble, substantive account of the good life that sustains my interest in writ-
ing on the topic. So I will offer a modest proposal. Stated as a set of 
ordinaP precepts for individuals, it is simply that we should first immu-
nize ourselves against bad fortune by acquiring the power to detach our-
selves from harm. (The object is not to become detached, but to acquire the 
ability to detach; not to have the ability to ignore events or deceive our-
selves about them, but rather, by means of understanding them, to be 
able to control the damage they do.) Second, we should construct and fol-
Iowa schematic, practicable, revisable plan for our whole lives2 - a plan 
* My main intellectual debts for the ideas in this paper, beyond the obvious ones to the 
history of philosophy and the people cited in the footnotes, are to three groups: the Social 
Philosophy and Policy Center's conference on the good life, which both prompted and re-
fined this paper; my seminar on the subject, offered in the fall of 1990 at the College of Wil-
liam and Mary, where some of these ideas were distilled from a long list of possible topics; 
and the Social and Political Philosophy Discussion Group, which gave me advice on a draft 
of the paper. Individuals who deserve mention include George Harris for discussion of the 
nature of integrity; Todd Davidson on the criterial good of unity; Eric Foster on the criterial 
good of action; Sebastian Dunne on (against) the notion of having a good life by accident; 
Mark Fowler on examples of good but miserable lives; and George Harris, Alan Fuchs, Sha-
ron Rives, Wayne Sumner, and Todd Davidson for criticism of the list of precepts. 
1 The precepts are meant to be ordinal (not lexical) in the sense that any momentary con-
flict between two of them must be resolved in favor of the one prior to the other on the list. 
2 I call attention below to the importance of a whole-life frame of reference in assessing 
the goods realized in a life. This precept simply acknowledges that importance and proposes 
a modest amount of schematic planning. Those who find the notion of a life-plan either 
empty or wrongheaded may yet be able to assent to the proposal here. 
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which, if followed successfully, will accomplish the following things (in 
lexical order3): it will create and sustain the exercise of the deontic vir-
tues (traits that issue in actions required for a productive social life: rec-
iprocity, justice, fidelity, and so on); it will create and sustain in us a high 
level of goal-directed activity; it will leave open at least one possibility, 
consistent with the above, for having a fulfilling and beautiful life; it will 
create and sustain the prudence required to minimize the need for de-
tachment (especially the sort of detachment that flattens affect, reduces 
expectations, and induces passivity). Third, within the framework of such 
, a plan, we should (in the following nonlexical order) cultivate loving re-
lationships and make them just and beautiful; find a vocation and follow 
it; act as if the Aristotelian principle4 were tI1;le; stay calm; be passionate; 
be convivial; and, ultimately, stop trying to have a good life and get on 
with it. Then if our lives are not good by accident, or not good as a by-
product of the activity bounded by those precepts, we will be able to 
make them good, in at least one robust sense of that term, under almost 
any circumstances. 
The preliminary material assembled in the following sections is meant 
to make those precepts plausible. But the precepts are not themselves 
meant to be, or to imply, a particular account of the good life-or even of 
a good one. If one labels the rest of the paper theoretical, then the pre-
cepts are meta-theoretical. They define a way of managing the pluralis-
tic results of the theoretical inquiry. The modus vivendi they define is 
plausible, I believe, in the light of those results, when one considers the 
uncertainty of life, its vulnerability to reversals, its resilience (in either a 
good or bad direction), the multiplicity of ways in which a bad life can be-
come a good one, and the self-defeating gap between a contrived life and 
a good one. For rhetorical reasons, I will say no more about my substan-
tive aims, lest they appear ignorant, self-indulgent, and embarrassingly 
autobiographical. I will also hide, as best I can, the disappointingly lim-
ited consequences of this inquiry for the rest of ethics and social and po-
litical philosophy. Such deception calls for a disgracefully misleading 
introduction. 
1. WHOLE LIVES 
Commercial speech encourages the belief that lithe good life" is some-
thing like a good vacation, or a good house, or a good meal- at best a 
long stretch of l),appiness. One can have (and lose) the good life repeat-
3 "This is an order which requires us to satisfy the first principle in the ordering before 
we can move on to the second, the second before we consider the third, and so on. A prin-
ciple does not corne into play until those previous to it are either fully met or do not apply." 
John Rawls, A Theon; of Justice (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1971), p, 43, 
4 "Other things begin equal, human beings enjoy the exercise of their realized capacities 
(their innate or trained abilities), and this enjoyment increases the more the capacity is re-
alized, or the greater its complexity," Ibid" p, 426, 
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edly; whether one has it at a given moment will be determined by the 
quality of one's life at that moment. 
There is a more interesting line to take for present purposes: Living is 
the process of creating a single, unitary, spatiotemporal object-a life. A 
life has a value as an object, as a whole. It is not always the case that its 
value as an object will be a function of the value of its spatiotemporal 
parts considered separately. But it is always the case that an evaluation 
of the parts will be incomplete until they are understood in the context 
of the whole life. What seems so clearly valuable (or required, or excel-
lent) when we focus on a thin temporal slice of a life (or a single, long 
strand of a life) may turn out to be optional, or, awful, or vicious when we 
take a larger view. And it is the life as a whole that we consider when we 
think about its value in relation to other things, or as part of the cosmos. 
This focus on the entire life is explicit in Aristotleand, in more or less 
elaborated versions, is to be found in a long succession of texts in the his-
tory of ethics. It is my impression of that history, however, that despite 
the efforts of some major philosophers the whole-life frame of reference 
has gradually receded into the background under systematic pressure 
from Christian theology (with its emphasis on the universal availability 
of redemption), consequentialism (with its forward-looking, fluctuating 
summations of expected value), and deontological theories (with their 
II antecedentialist" emphasis). 
Whatever the cause, the focus on the parts, or on the sum of the parts 
of a life, obscures some important features of the inquiry here.5 One of 
them is the extent to which one's own estimate of the value of one's life 
is necessarily inconclusive. (For example, others will have to judge my life 
as a whole, because its character as a whole is not likely to be predictable 
while I am around to judge it, and because many important holistic con-
siderations - such as its beauty, excellence, justice, and net are 
things that I am either not well-situated to judge or at least not in a priv-
ileged position to judge.) Somethi):lg else obscured by the focus on parts 
of a life is the range of ways in which a single event or characteristic, 
without wide causal connections to other elements of one's life, can none-
theless ruin it (for example, the possibility that a monstrously unjust act 
can indelibly stain a whole life6). Also, focusing on the parts of a life 
tends to obscure the roles played by aesthetic criteria and the notion of 
excellence in the evaluation of a life. 
II. UNITARY CONCEPTIONS OF THE GOOD LIFE 
It is useful to divide conceptions of the good life into pluralist and uni-
tary ones. A pluralist conception holds (a) that the goods realizable in a 
5 Compare Robert Nozick's remarks on this subject in his Philosophical EXplanations (Cam-
bridge: Harvard University Press, 1981), pp, 411f£. 
6 One of the themes of Costa-Gavras's 1989 film, The Music Box. 
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human life are genuinely diverse, that is, not reducible to a single species, 
(b) that genuinely diverse combinations of goods are sufficient to make 
a life a good one, and thus that good lives may differ in kind as well as 
degree, and (c) that any theoretical explanation to be found for the diverse 
array of good lives will be purely formal, or schematic, or perhaps merely 
heuristic. A unitary (or monistic) conception, by contrast, holds either (d) 
that goods are not diverse, and thus good lives differ only in degree, or 
(e) that whether goods are diverse or not, there is only one set of them 
sufficient for making a life a good one, or (f) that though there may be 
m,ore than one sufficient set, all of them have in common the same or-
dered subset of necessary goods, a subset rich enough, or ordered rigidly 
enough, to ensure that all good lives will be remarkably similar. 
The history of philosophical accounts of the good life can plausibly be 
written as the history of failed unitary conceptions, with footnotes to plu-
ralist ones. Would it be profitable to extend this history by putting for-
. ward yet another unitary account? The following consider~tions suggest 
that such a course would be futile. 7 
III. CRITERIAL GOODS 
Assume that attempts to construct an account of the final good are ei-
ther vacuous or unsound. That is, assume that we cannot specify, in a 
nonvacuous way, a final or ultimate intrinsic good (for example, happi-
ness) such that every other thing we value as good is valued ultimately 
only as a means to the final good. Then consider the range of things that 
might plausibly be regarded as (a) distinct goods, not reducible to others 
on the list, (b) intrinsic, necessary, or widely instrumental goods,8 and 
(c) definitive, at least in part, of a good life. We may call goods falling into. 
this range "criterial" ones with respect to a good life. Here is a reasonably 
full list of them. 
1. The material conditions necessary for sustaining life and consciousness. On 
the assumption that a vegetative existence is not a life in any sense rele-
7 A deflective remark may be in order here. The prima facie diversity of goods is a com-
monplace. A recital of the obvious candidates would be pointless if the result were to leave 
open the possibility that they could all be generated and nicely ordered by some one over-
arching good (say, rationality or self-realization). It will be my contention, though, that an 
"inclusive" account of the good life-one which defines such a life as the realization (through 
some overarching aim) of a maximal array of goods-is only plausible when we jump too 
quickly over the lists to. follow. I hold a similar view of the contention (which one assumes 
is almost audible by now in the minds of those interested in Aristotelian accounts of these 
matters) that lists of the goods that might be realized in a life are pointless - that the real 
issue is which, among the various good lives that are possible, is the best. I will argue that 
this issue, too, does not look fruitful against a reasonably full set of lists. 
8 The idea here is to limit the list by excluding the indefinitely large number of things 
that have only limited, contingent, and instrumental worth. Intrinsic goods are those de-
sired for their own sake, and not (only) as a means to something else; necessary goods are 
those without which no (other) goods are realizable in a life; widely instrumental goods are 
those which, while not necessary, are useful as means to all (or almost all) other goods. 
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vant to this discussion, the material conditions for life and consciousness 
are bedrock necessary goods. Since they are so obvious, and so far from 
being sufficient for any sort of life that has been put forward as a good 
one, they are typically relegated to the background and not treated as de-
finitive "criteria" of a good life. But given the prevalence of war, famine, 
disease, and natural disaster, this reminder does not seem pointless. 
2. The quality of consciousness. Here the definitive criterion is a certain 
state or states of consciousness (sensation, pleasure, desire, serenity, pas-
sion, compassion, active contemplation, and so on). The good life is de-
fined, at least in part, as one in which such a state of consciousness is 
'actually achieved-either by design or by default-to a degree sufficient 
to warrant describing a whole life as a good one. 
3. Ul1derstanding. Here the definitive criterion is a form of knowledge 
or comprehension of the nature, value, and meaning of things, events, 
and experience. The good life is then defined as one iii which, among 
other things, soundness and completeness in such matters are to some 
extent achieved. Note that the criterion is an epistemic one, and that the 
good defined here is not reducible to a state of consciousness in which 
one merely believes things or has a simulacrum of understanding. 
4. Self-command. Here the definitive criterion is the possession of a 
sound self-concept and the ability to resolve states of consciousness into 
acts of will: decision, choice, and action. As a practical ability, then, this 
is not reducible to criterial goods 2 or 3 above. It defines the good life, at 
least in part, as one of will and action. It is a (nearly) universal instrumen-
tal good and is arguably both an intrinsic and a necessary one. 
5. The hannonization of reason, desire, and will. Here the definitive crite-
rion is not the quality of consciousness achieved (though that may be a 
byproduct), or the soundness and completeness of one's understanding, 
or action alone, but rather the unification of the multiple and often con-
flicting elements of action. Roughly speaking, there are three elements to 
be unified or harmonized: (a) the dispositions, motives, desires, needs, 
appetites, drives, impulses, raw energy, and intentions antecedent to ac-
tion (say, for short, desire); (b) the knowledge, practical wisdom, and de-
liberation characteristic of'deliberative rationality (or, for short, reason); 
and (c) the sort of self-command (or will) that resolves itself in choice. 
Unity may be understood in terms of an appropriate hierarchy of ele-
ments, in which, for example, desire and will are subordinated to reason 
(Plato, Freud); or in terms of the purification of one or more elements, for 
example, the purification of reason by the elimination of false beliefs 
(Epicurus, Marcus Aurelius), or the purification of desire (Epictetus), or 
the elimination of mixed motives (Kant). Or unity can be understood in 
terms af the ecstatic canvergence of all these elements in a single, trium-
phant, and definitive aim (Nietzsche). Lives are good, by this criterion, 
insofar as they achieve such unity. As a special sort of combination af the 
quality af cansciausness (2), understanding (3), and self-cammand (4), 
this fifth criterian is not simply reducible to' the conjunction af them. 
---- ,,~------
J\," 
20 LAWRENCE C. BECKER 
6. The exemplification of goodness-of-a-kind. Here the definitive criterion is 
the excellence or perfection of a certain type of thing, for example, an in-
dividual human being, a human community, the natural order, a divine 
order, <il tradition, or a narrative. A good life is defined as one that real-
izes (or contributes to) goodness-of-a-kind. Aristotelian accounts of excel-
lence are examples. Such accounts may be unitary-for example, by 
stressing the perfection of a single element, such as reason, which is 
thought to be the essential defining characteristic of the species - or they 
may be (more) inclusive, stressing the perfection of one or more sets of 
diverse elements characteristic of members of the species. 
7. Meaningful opportunity. Here the definitive criterion lies in the liberty 
(either negative or positive) and autonomy to choose and carry out 
projects that are valuable, valuable enough to warrant the claim that the 
mere potential to pursue projects gives value to one's ,Whole life. Claims 
that autonomous human lives have a dignity that is immeasurable, in-
commensurable, infinite, beyond price - and that the loss of autonomy 
forecloses all possibility for a good life - embody this criterion. Note that 
this criterion is not reducible to a "sense" or "experience" of freedom or 
autonomy; it is not, that is, reducible to a version of the quality of con-
sciousness (criterial good 2). Nor is it reducible to mere self-command 
(good 4). The happy slave or prisoner-unaware, who may be blissful and 
able to act, has lost the chance for a genuinely free and autonomous life. 
Moreover, what is at stake here is potential alone. The potential to choose 
and carry out valuable projects is sufficient to give life dignity and make 
it good, even if that potential is never actualized. This criterion is not a 
consequentialist one. 
8. Meaningful activity. Here the definitive criterion lies in the effort to 
achieve valuable ends, that is, in the active pursuit of projects valuable 
enough to warrant the claim that their mere pursuit (regardless of success 
or potential for success) has made one's whole life valuable. We may 
think of Socrates, here, for whom doing philosophy was apparently both 
necessary and sufficient for the good life, and perhaps also of Camus's 
rebel, in perpetual, creative revolt against the absurdity of the human 
quest for meaning in an indifferent universe. 
9. Meaningful necessity. Here the definitive criterion is found in being re-
quired for, or compellingly called to a role in, something apart from one's 
own life - something good enough to make carrying out that role (what-
ever the result) sufficient for a good life. Note again that this criterion is 
distinct from the attendant experience of happiness or exhilaration which 
sometimes comes from recognizing such necessity. It is also distinct (or 
at least it is meant to be distinct) from the value of the activity or the out-
come. 9 Religious vocations, or immersion in politics, a profession, an or-
ganization, or a family can be goods of this sort. These goods are thought 
9 See Kazuo Ishiguro, The Remains of the Day (New York: Knopf, 1990). 
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to be sufficient to give one's whole life meaning no matter how small the 
role one plays or how remote or ambiguous the consequences. 10 
10. Self-love. Here the definitive criterion lies in the self-esteem required 
to avoid self-destructive acts, the self-respect required to defend one's lib-
erty and integrity, and the concern for one's own interests that gives 
shape to rational deliberation. Without self-love, no other goods in one's 
life can be sustained long enough, or realized completely enough, to 
make one's whole life good. Self-love is a distinct sort of widely instru-
mental good. 
11. Benevolence. Here the definitive criterion lies in the direct concern or 
affection one person may have for the being and well-being of another. 
This concern or affection is measured not by the giver's state of conscious-
ness or acts of will alone, and not by what th~ giver produces in the re-
cipient, but by the congruence between the other's well-being and the 
giver's desire for it. This is held by some to be an intrinsic good, since 
people express it in self-sacrificial ways (implicitly valuing it for its own 
sake?). But of course, its instrumental connection to the vast array of 
goods that can only arise from stable, cooperative social relationships 
(from families to international organizations) gives us a warrant for re-
garding it as a widely instrumental good. 
12. Mutual love. Here the definitive criterion is the reciprocal desire, af-
fection, benevolence, empathy, and conviviality that might be thought to 
be the source of the most deeply rewarding states of consciousness we 
can have; the matrix in which we can achieve the most perfect harmony 
of reason, desire, and will; the characteristic through which we can best 
exemplify what is good of our kind, or the most meaningful kinds of op-
portunity and necessity; the source of the only sustainable form of self-
love, and hence all of the goods for which it is necessary; or a necessary 
condition for the sort of self-sustaining cooperation that makes produc-
tive social life (and hence all good lives) possible, Thus, in addition to be-
ing an intrinsic good, it has a strong claim to being necessary. 
13. Sexuality. Here the definitive criterion is the expression, in con-
sciousness and conduct, of the sexual aspect of our human nature, in 
erotic love (mutual or not); sexual behavior, and reproduction. Erotic ex-
perience and sexual desire are intrinsic goods as states of consciousness, 
of course, and important forms of mutual love are erotically charged or 
otherwise sexual. Moreover, our sexuality may be necessarily linked to 
our self-concept, will, and self-love. But it seems plausible to hold that 
there is a species of intrinsic good, here, that is not reducible to one or the 
other of those other goods (states of consciousness, self-command, self-
love, mutual love) or to a simple conjunction of them. Like the unity of 
reason, desire, and will, the intrinsic good of sexuality lies in its unique 
10 See Walt Harrington, "The Mystery of Goodness," The Washington Post Magazine, Jan-
uary 6, 1991. The article is about Bryan Stevenson, director of the Alabama Capital Repre-
sentation Project. 
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fusion of compelling, sensuous activity (not necessarily acts of will) aimed 
at the satisfaction of egoistic, other-directed, specifically (though not nec-
essarily overtly) sexual desires. We have reason to believe that sexuality 
suffuses, and contributes powerfully to the good of, a great area of our 
lives. Its connection to reproduction, and hence to the necessary material 
conditions of life, is a warrant for calling it a widely instrumental good. 
14. Achievement. Here the definitive criterion lies in the results, rather 
than the antecedent elements, of action, in the product rather than the 
opportunity or necessity of the project, in the external outcome rather 
than the inner experience. The good life is thus one of productive activ-
ity, intentional or otherwise - good because, and to the extent that, its 
products are good. (Even a miserable wretch may have a good life in this 
sense.) It seems a safe empirical generalizc;ltion to say that for most hu-
mans productive activity is an intrinsic good. Given the scarcity of re-
sources, the perils of the natural environment, and" the limitations of 
human nature, achievement must be on this list as an instrumental value 
as well. 
15. Rectitude. Here the element that is definitive of a good life is mor-
ally right conduct. The good life is the morally correct one, the just one, 
the one that fulfills moral requirements. Moral requirements can be dis-
tinguished from the normative implications of the other criterial goods,in 
a variety of familiar ways. For example, moral requirements are typically 
held to include (a) a universalization principle that bars purely egoistic 
pursuits and requires similar action in similar circumstances, and (b) ei-
ther a value-optimization principle (under which the right is defined as 
the option that realizes the higher net balance of good) or a principle that 
makes the right independent of the good in some important way (such 
as by making it independent of consequences). Philosophers are divided 
about whether this is an intrinsic good or a widely instrumental one. 
16. Integrity. Here the thing definitive of a good life is an intact, coher-
ent identity as a particular kind of life-for example, noble or ignoble, 
courageous or cowardly, honorable or dishonorable. The contention is 
that in order to have a good life, one must first have a life. That life must 
be something identifiable, in terms of essential defining characteristics, 
as a life of a certain sort. Integrity, in this nonmoral sense, is a necessary 
condition for every sort of good life and may perhaps be sufficient for one. 
17. A life as an aesthetic object. Here the thing definitive of a good life is 
the extent to which, considered as an object, the life has intrinsic aesthetic 
value. Is the life beautiful, sublime, or a work of art? This good, while of-
ten coupled with those of understanding (3), self-command (4), and in-
tegrity (16), is in principle distinct from them, since there is no necessary 
conceptual connection between a unified, coherent, intact, or exem-
plarylllife and an aesthetically valuable one. Chaos can be beautiful; so 
can ruins. 
11 The trivial exception is the life that exemplifies an aesthetically valuable object. 
,( t.' , 
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Most of these criterial goods (perhaps all but the last) are intuitively 
plausible as partial criteria of the good life. Any attempt to select only 
one, to the exclusion or lexical subordination of all the others, will be very 
difficult to defend. In fact, standard unitary accounts of the good life 
rarely attempt to do that. Instead, they attempt to show that one or an-
other of these criteria, when properly satisfied, will generate a life that 
necessarily satisfies (most of) the other criteria as well. Since attempts to 
show this inevitably involve some redescription and reorganization of the 
other criteria, it is useful to briefly survey the major ones. 
IV. UNITARY ACCOUNTS OF THE GOOD LIFE 
Suppose we catalog the most influential accounts of the good life un-
der these headings: congruence, inner unity, human ext:;ellence, personal 
excellence or achievement, personal well-being or fulfillment, right con-
duct, autonomous activity, vocation, aesthetic value, and rationality. 
Congruence theories measure a good life by the degree to which it con-
forms to, or fits into, or is attuned to a given external order. Injunctions 
to follow nature, or to do God's will, or to accept one's place in a given 
social order fall under this heading, and under criterial goods 6 (exempli-
fication of goodness-of-a-kind) and 9 (meaningful necessity) described 
above. Stoicism is a leading example. But it is crucial to notice that the 
various Stoic and religious disciplines (detachment, resignation, humility) 
designed to achieve such congruence are also offered as routes to recti-
tude, personal happiness, human excellence, inner harmony, meaning-
ful freedom and activity, and (occasionally) beauty and/or achievement. 
It is obvious that many modern readers reject all congruence accounts on 
the grounds that none of them can actually achieve all of this, or even 
very much of it. The connection between doctrines of congruence and the 
sort of indoctrination that produces prejudice, reinforces injustice, and 
perpetuates oppression is clear; clear too is the danger that conformity to 
an external order will suppress individual excellence. Thus, it is highly 
implausible to accept any ordering of priorities compatible with a unitary 
account of the good life based on congruence. In order to meet the obvi-
ous objections to a congruence theory, we need to have an independent 
criterion of rectitude to rule out conformity to an unjust social order, and 
we need to preserve autonomy in some sense-for example, by insisting 
that conformity be either voluntary and reversible, or hypothetically ra-
tional, or both. However, adding these conditions to congruence yields 
a pluralist account, not a unitary one. 
Accounts based on inner unity measure a good life by its inner har-
mony, unity, integrity, or wholeness-particularly with respect to reason, 
passion, and will. Here good 5 (the harmonization of reason, desire, and 
will) has been given pride of place. Advocates of this view-for example, 
Plato, Butler, Nietzsche, and Freud -insist that it is also the route to sat-
isfying other criteria. Thus, Plato makes inner unity's compatibility with 
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individual happiness, ideal communities, and human excellence central 
to his discussion; Butler is concerned to reconcile self-love and benevo-
lence; Nietzsche puts inner unity forward as a measure of human excel-
lence and aesthetic value; Freud connects it to personal happiness and the 
conditions for civilization. Again, however, it is fair to say that the mo-
nism is insupportable. A moral monster can have inner unity, and justice 
surely should not be subordinated to that sort of unity. A consciousness 
flickering just abOve the level of extinction can be unified, but surely we 
think a fuller version of human excellence is better than a near-vegetative 
one, even if some degree of unity has to be sacrificed to get it. The goods 
of mutual love, achievement, meaningful opportunity, meaningful neces-
sity, and meaningful activity all support this conclusion. They cannot all 
plausibly be subordinated, all of the time, to inner unity. No account of 
the good life seems defensible if it is unitary in that sense. Or rather, if 
we insist that unity is sufficient for a good life, we mJst be prepared to 
conclude that some" good" lives are not good all-things-ccinsidered. 
A unitary theory based on human excellence measures a good life by the 
degree to which it exemplifies, or realizes, generic human characteristics. 
This is a version of criterial good 6 (exemplification of goodness-of-a-
kind). Aristotelian accounts of human flourishing fall under this heading. 
But some other accounts of self-realization belong here as well, whether 
grounded in metaphysics (for example, Idealism, dialectical materialism, 
existentialism), evolutionary biology, or developmental physiology and 
psychology; accounts that emphasize achievements measured against ge-
neric human capacities rather than personal potential also fall under this 
rubric. The fundamental problem with unitary accounts along these lines 
is that they are insupportable without independent guarantees that hu-
man excellence is compatible with inner unity, integrity, congruence, rec-
titude, and mutual love. After all, if our consciousness is by nature as 
chaotic as Freud thought, or as plastic as Skinner thought, then the per-
fection of it will be perfect chaos or perfect plasticity, not unity; if we are 
by nature more selfish than righteous,then the perfection of that nature 
will lead to injustice. Of course, it may be that the perfection of human 
nature is compatible with the other goods on the list. But the recognition 
that it must be so, if human excellence is to be the leading measure of a 
good life, is tantamount to the recognition that other goods cannot be 
subordinated to human excellence. 
Personal excellence or achievement measures a good life by the extent to 
which it realizes one's personal potential, given one's particular circum-
stances and talents. The standard here is individual (rather than generic) 
human excellence, but the objections to using it as a unitary account are 
the same as those for the generic account. 12 The temptation to use it (as 
12 This will, perhaps, be evident enough from a brief outline of David Norton's case for 
a eudaimonistic account of ethics and the good life, in his Personal Destillies (Princeton: Prince-
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opposed to a generic standard) may come in part from an egalitarian de-
sire to have an account of the good life that makes it available, in princi-
to everyone. 
Personal well-being or fulfillment provides an account of the good life in 
terms of the degree to which (a) the cup of one's experience is filled with 
pleasure (or at least is free from pain), (b) one's needs and desires are sat-
isfied (or at least not frustrated), and (c) the conditions under which one 
experiences the world are conducive to pleasure, satisfaction, and the ab-
sence of pain and frustration. Hedonism and Epicureanism belong here, 
as do various psychological theories of "adjustment" that look similar to 
Stoic, Buddhist, or Christian disciplines for the transformation, diminu-
tion, or elimination of desire, but stripped of their metaphysical doctrines. 
It is notorious that such doctrines, to be plausible at all as accounts of the 
good life, must not be compatible with a purely passive existence in 
which nothing is achieved, or with a contrived existence' in which (as in 
a Nozickian experience machine)13 fulfillment is achieved through illu-
sion, or with a stunted existence in which one's generic'human capaci-
ties are deliberately allowed to wither, or with a ruthless disregard for 
justice. 
A much more robust version of this candidate for the good life is pos-
sible. It centers on the nature of positive personal experience and the ma-
terial conditions necessary for such experience; it acknowledges diversity 
in the types of good experience; it recognizes that circumstances may 
make personal fulfillment or well-being (defined in terms of such expe-
rience) impossible, and that certain sorts of efforts to guarantee such ex-
perience are self-defeating. It then makes the case that (viewed from 
ton University Press, 1976), Norton understands the "daimon" in eudaimonism to refer to 
one's innate, individual "ideal possibility," This possibility is understood as having norma-
tive force. Thus, the basic imperatives are to know oneself (one's daimon) and to choose to 
approximate it, that is, to turn it, as completely as possible, from an ideal possibility into 
an actuality. The life one thus chooses to live will be dominated by the virtue of integrity, 
the pursuit of one's unique destiny. This defines the notion of moral necessity. But justice 
and benevolence are implicit in this moral necessity, since one will refuse to consume (or 
exclude others from) things that are not necessary for self-actualization, will take delight in 
others' achievements, and will be rewarded by their reciprocal justice and benevolence. Nor-
ton's account is pluralistic in two senses. First, each person's daimon in unique, and thus 
there are as many definitions of the good life as there are persons. Second, each person goes 
through a developmental process that has distinct stages (childhood, adolescence, maturity, 
and old age), correlated with incommensurably distinct phases of that unique daimon. But 
in my terms Norton's is a unitary account, since it unambiguously insists that working out 
one's personal destiny (that is, finding and taking the self-actualizing path from one's ac-
tuality to one's daimon or ideal possibility) is the good (or best) life for everyone. 
13 The allusion here is to a thought-experiment introduced by Robert Nozick in Anarchy, 
State, and Utopia (New York: Basic Books, 1974), pp. 42-45. The question is this: If our only 
ultimate concern about the quality of our lives is about the way our experience "feels from 
the inside," then if there were a machine that could (reliably) stimulate one's brain to pro-
duce any felt-experience imaginable, what objection could there be to defining the sort of 
experience one wants to have and then living one's whole life in the machine? 
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"inside" one's life, so to speak) personal well-being, broadly conceived, 
must.be the ultimate measure of a good life. 14 
What these powerful descriptions of well-being lack, it seems to me, is 
something that comes easily when we adopt a whole-life frame of refer-
ence.' From that standpoint it is not hard to see how figures like 
Sardanopolis, Lucrezia Borgia, Catherine the Great, or de Sade (without 
the difficulties they encountered) might have had lives characterized by 
a high level of personal well-being, and yet had lives which, as a whole, 
were so unjust, ugly, or pointless as to preclude our describing them as 
good. And from that standpoint it is not hard to see how Joan of Are, 
Kierkegaard, Virginia Woolf, or Albert Schweitzer might have had lives 
so desolate as not to qualify as ones of personal well-being, and yet had 
lives which, as a whole, were so noble, profoundly creative, courageous, 
or self-sacrificial that we are compelled to describe th~m as good. If these 
judgments are right, as I believe, then personal well-being or fulfillment 
is not a plausible candidate for a unitary account of the good life. 
Right conduct measures a good life by the extent of its conformity to 
moral requirements, where those requirements are defined under some 
spedal conception of morality. IS Such a special conception might be de-
fined, for example, in terms of universi;llizable, rationally justifiable rules 
of conduct directed by concern for the welfare of others. Alternatively, it 
might be defined in terms of a single, supreme principle held to be de-
terminative for all conduct. Either way, right conduct is very often 
thought to be a constraint on conceptions of the good life, in the sense 
that pleasure, or congruence, or achievement will be required to stay 
14 See James Griffin, Well-Being (Oxford: Oarendon Press, 1986). Griffin lists five "pru-
dential values" for well-being (pp. 67-68): accomplishment, the components of human ex-
istence or agency, understanding, enjoyment, and deep personal relations. He states that 
"being moral enters [this] list only in a limited way: only by being part of what it is to be 
at peace with one's neighbour and with oneself" (p. 70). In considering the necessity of moral 
rectitude for the good life, Griffin considers the Claim that a certain sort of moral failure might 
make a good life impossible: 
It is an extravagant claim, and ... rests on a confusion. We need to split "the good 
life" into two. There is a sense in which moral failure, being a failure to act for the best 
reasons, is a falling off from an ideal- and not just in the trivial, circular sense that it 
is not the most moral or most rational1ife. It is not the finest life: the life one would 
hope to lead. But there is another conception of a good life, a life one would hope to 
lead. It is the sense that appears in judgments such as that it is better to be moral ami 
alive than to be moral and thereby lose one's life, or that it is sometimes better to fail 
morally and stay alive than not to fail and thereby lose one's life. And it is this sec-
ond conception that should be the base for judgments of well-being in moral theory. 
(p.69) 
It is my contention that while this is plausible in an account of well-being made from "in-
side" one's life, its very plausibility makes well-being defective as a candidate description 
of the good life. 
lS As opposed to one in which whatever one ought to do or be all-things-considered is 
morally required. 
GOOD LIVES: PROLEGOMENA 27 
(mostly)16 within the boundaries defined by moral duty and obligation. 
Some basic level of justice or right conduct may thus be thought to be a 
necessary condition of a good life. But how basic? How necessary? Does 
unjust cQnduct foreclose the possibility of a good life? Is it possible for 
people to foreclose the possibility of good lives for themselves by being 
fundamentally, dispositionally unjust, even though they restrain them-
selves from unjust conduct? The answers to these questions are by no 
means obvious. What does it mean, for example, to say that a murderer 
might have lost forever the possibility for a good life? It amounts to mak-
ing claims such as the following: 
People who have acted unjustly, and by so doing have unforgivably 
and irreparably destroyed the good life of another, have also neces-
sarily destroyed or foreclosed the possibility of a g00d life for them-
selves. 
One assumes that if wrongdoers repair the damage they do, and/or are 
properly forgiven, their injustice has been rectified, and no obstacle (from 
a criterion of right conduct) remains in the way of their having good lives. 
But suppose neither condition can be met because the wrong involved is 
unforgivable and the damage cannot possibly be repaired. The wrongdo-
ers can never, in that respect, rectify the wrong they have done. Then one 
of the following must be true: (a) any unforgivable and irreparable wrong 
will stain one's entire life, such that no antecedent or subsequent conduct, 
and no other good ever realized in one's life, can make that life a good 
one; or (b) the stains such wrongs inh'oduce are merely local ones, whose 
effects on one's prospects for a good life are minimized over time, or can-
celed by past and futme goods; 17 or (c) only wrongs of a certain magni-
tude foreclose all possibility of a good life. 18 I suggest that (a) is wholly 
implausible. It entails that one's life as a whole can never be redeemed 
from the minor short- and long-term damage done by (for example) an 
unforgivable and irreparable act of petty cruelty. If that were true, we 
could never hope to find an example of a good life, unless we defined 
"unforgivable and irreparable" in such a way as to collapse this category 
into either (b) or (c). But that would be no help, because both (b) and (c) 
entail that rectitude is not a necessary condition for a good life; both en-
tail that, under certain conditions, a good life is possible without recti-
16 1 say "mostly" because it is usually conceded that injustice is an inescapable part of the 
human condition, that all of us are to some degree culpable, and yet that even fairly exten-
sive, persistent culpability is not a bar to having a good life. 
17 An issue raised pointedly in Woody Allen's 1990 film, Crimes and Misdemeanors. 
18 For example, one might say that the stain on the wrongdoer's life is proportional to 
the harm to the victim's life, so that to destroy the victim's good life is to destroy one's own, 
to desh'oy ten years of it is to destroy ten years of one's own, etc. 
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tude. This generates an unpalatable story, but I do not readily see how 
that can be avoided. 
Leaving aside the question of whether right conduct is a necessity of 
the good life, it remains to be seen whether such conduct is ever sufficient 
to make a life a good one. The usual objection here is that the quality of 
consciousness, self-love, mutual love, liberty, and various nonmoral 
forms of excellence will often get unjustifiably damaged in a life domi-
nated by rectitude. Whatever we think about the sufficiency of rectitude 
in lives bereft of these other important goods, surely their absence is 
cause for great regret. Albert Schweitzer reportedly said that by no stretch 
of the imagination could he be called a happy man. Did he nonetheless 
have a good life? Perhaps. Could we imagine a better life for him, with-
out altering his rectitude, by imagining that his reason, desire, and will 
had been more unified? Or that he had had more meaningful opportu-
nity, or mutual love, or pleasure in his life? Certainly. Thus, it seems that 
even if rectitude is necessary and sufficient for a good life it is only min-
imally sufficient, never desirable by itself, and only tolerable alone when 
all other forms of the good life are impossible. It may be, as I shall urge 
below, that while nothing is more important to the good life than recti-
tude, there are other things which are as important. If that is so, we will 
have to give up the effort to make our account a unitary one. 
Autonomous activity measures a good life by the extent of one's ability 
to direct one's own affairs, to construct and live out one's own concep-
tion of a good life. The idea here, drawn from good 4 (self-command), is 
that the essence of a good life lies in the dignity, or nobility, that comes 
from being the author of one's own story, the creator of one's own good 
life. Autonomous activity requires opportunity or liberty, both negative 
and positive, and agency: the ability to conceive of goals, to deliberate 
about their worth and about means to them, and to choose to pursue 
them. Obviously, there are antecedent necessary conditions for the exer-
cise of autonomy; such conditions include life itself, the requisite cogni-
tive, conative, and physical abilities, the availability of resources, and the 
cooperation of others. But without autonomy life is mere existence; con-
duct is mere reflex or conditioned response; knowledge, ability,and re-
sources are mere inputs; and cooperative social life is akin to what is 
found among the social insects. The nature and extent of such autonomy 
in human lives is disputed, but the notion that it is central to a good life 
is now very generally held. 
It is tempting to think that autonomy, so conceived, bears roughly the 
same relation to a good life as does right conduct: that it is a necessary 
condition for it, and perhaps just barely sufficient in extreme circum-
stances. It seems impossible to argue for anything stronger, since auton-
omous agents may be desperately unfulfilled and unhappy, have lives 
full of inner turmoil, be decidedly mediocre, be bereft of loving relation-
ships, act with great cruelty and injustice, and achieve virtually nothing 
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good. The claim that autonomy is sufficient to make all of that into a good 
1ife is just barely credible. It is credible only for circumstances so reduced 
(a state of nature, solitary confinement) that nothing more is possible. At 
most autonomy is like right conduct, that is, necessary and occasionally, 
under extreme circumstances, sufficient. But if that is true of both, nei-
ther can be a unitary account of the good life; if we are committed to such 
an account, we must choose one or the other. And if we suppose that au-
tonomy is a precondition for morally right conduct, then it appears that we 
must choose autonomy. 
, There is, however, some reason to doubt that liberty (and hence auton-
omy) is a necessary condition of a good life. 19 Consider the following 
line of argument about the value of liberty, ",:hich begins with a distinc-
tion between negative and positive sorts. Negative liberty is the absence 
of impediments to action. 20 PositiveJiberty is the presence of the means 
necessary for effective choice and action. Conceived in this way, negative 
liberty is not a "thing," but rather the absence of something. It is like the 
hole in a doughnut; take away the doughnut and it is hard to see the hole 
at all, let alone regard it as valuable; take away the impediments to action, 
and negative liberty, as an "object," vanishes with them. It may be wise, 
then, to organize a discussion of the value of negative liberty by begin-
ning with things, rather than the spaces they leave, by looking at the im-
pediments rather than at the elbowroom those impediments define. 
When we do that, it is clear that among impediments, as among 
doughnuts, some are good and some are bad, from the agent's point of 
view. The friction caused by an obstacle is sometimes a necessary condi-
tion for doing what we want to do, and, when it is, we see the obstacle 
as valuable. In fact, valuable impediments provide us with another sort 
of liberty: positive or material liberty. If the impediment is a good one, 
the corresponding negative liberty - or absence of the impediment - is de-
rivatively bad. We should be able to learn all we need to know about the 
derivative values of derivative things (such as holes and elbowroom) by 
immediate inference from the things that define them. 
Positive liberty, by contrast, is not the absence of something but rather 
the presence of it: the presence, indeed the possession, of the means nec-
essary for action. It is the "stuff" we require in order to act in the space 
provided by negative liberty. The presence of social and political institu-
19 The remainder of this section on autonomous activity is adapted from an unpublished 
conference comment presented in response to a paper by William Ruddick and James 
Rachels, "Lives and Liberty." Their revised version was published in Tile Inner Citadel: Es-
says on Individual Autonomy, ed. John Christman (New York: Oxford University Press, 1989), 
pp.221-33. 
2fI Negative liberty should not be equated with the absence of coercion or active interfer-
ence. Liberty can be limited by passive, even accidental impediments, as well as by active, 
intentional, or coercive ones. Negative political liberty should be defined quite generally as 
the absence of impediments imposed or legitimated by political institutions. Other sorts of 
negative liberty - social, interpersonal, physical- may be defined correspondingly. 
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tians gives us the means - the liberty - to lead lives that we could not oth-
erwise have. So do friends, courage, and physical strength. Individualist 
political theory tends to resist labeling such things as "liberty." But the 
description of economic resources, education, and many other things as 
"libe'rating" is surely a warrant for calling them liberties, and it is unas-
sailable that negative liberty alone is of very little importance unless one 
can or might be able to use it. For using it, some resources (psychologi-
cal and physical) are necessary, and we may plausibly speak of them as 
constituting our positive or material liberty. 
The question, then, is whether liberty of either sort is a necessary con-
dition for a good life. Since we know that various criterial goods that 
might make a life a good one are possible without genuine liberty (one J 
can be happy and feel free in a room one does not know to be a locked 
cell), and since advocates of autonomy connect it to the very nature of hu-
man action itself, perhaps the question is whether, without liberty of 
some sort, we can have anything describable as a life .at all, good or bad, 
as opposed to physical existence. 21 Why not? Suppose my name is Cal-
vin, and suppose that my creator has predestined every detail of my life, 
every nuance of my thought and action, including the fact that through 
theological study I have now discovered that my life is predetermined. 
Does this mean that I have not had a (good) life to this point, or that I 
cannot continue to have one? I have no genuine liberty at all to do any-
thing other than what God has planned for me. I am, in effect, a total 
slave to God. But I certainly think I have a life. I remember, and feel, and 
feel joy, anticipation, fear, responsibility, pride, guilt, shame, and obli-
gation. I fear judgment. I do not know how things will turn out for me, 
but I suspect I am one of the elect and am glad for that. In any case, I 
know that whatever happens, it will be exactly as God has planned. In 
the meantime, I will live the life that I have been given. Given God's will, 
nothing else could have happened. I was never at liberty to do other than 
I did in fact do. I had a life without liberty. But I rejoice in it, and affirm 
it anew every day. 
End of story. Now what is wrong with it? It surely does not suggest 
that we cannot have (good) lives without liberty. Negative liberty, in gen-
eral terms, is the space left to us by the political, social, personal, and 
metaphysical impediments that surround us; positive liberty is the stuff 
that enables us to act in that space. What Calvin imagines is that the space 
and stuff available to him are enough for exactly one life: the one God has 
given him to live, without liberty. If so, then liberty is not a necessary 
condition for having a good life. 
Vocation measures a good life by the extent to which one is drawn into 
a necessary role in something good enough so that playing one's part in 
21 See Ruddick and Rachels, "Lives and Liberty," for a developed analysis of this dis-
tinction. 
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it promises to yield a better life than one could reasonably hope to con-
struct for oneself. The plausibility of this vision of a good life rests on 
showing that participation in the role to which one is drawn or called is 
either morally right, licit, or sufficiently good to justify participation and 
to warrant the loss of autonomy involved in surrendering to it. How can 
this be shown? 
We may begin with the observation that autonomy often undermines 
inner harmony-the unity of reason, desire, and will described under 
criterial good 5. Autonomy inevitably separates the autonomous subject 
from all its objects - other people, projects, achievements, and even most 
states of consciousness (all but one of which - self-consciousness - are ex-
perienced as things separable from the self). And autonomy systemati-
cally undermines the perceived value of opportunity, activity, and 
achievement by insisting that their worth as elements of a: good life is ul-
timately subjective in the sense that it is legislated by the self. Some de-
fenders of autonomy (for example, Kant) have in effect responded to such 
charges by arguing that the legislative activity of the autohomous self is 
generic, that is, it follows a path identical to that followed by every other 
autonomous agent. Autonomous action can thus be seen as a form of par-
ticipation in something greater than oneself, and thus may itself be a kind 
of vocation. Other defenders of autonomy may choose to attack the very 
idea of vocation as defined here, for example, by insisting on the neces-
sity of autonomy as the source of human dignity, moral rectitude, human 
excellence, and self-love. Insofar as vocations undermine autonomy, 
then, they undermine something necessary for a good life. Defenders of 
vocation may reply either by denying the possibility of genuine autonomy 
(for example, by arguing for a strong notion of the social self), or by de-
nying that autonomy is damaged by living out a vocation. 22 This last re-
ply seems sufficient to save a place for vocation in a pluralist account of 
the good life. Vocations are, after all, compatible with autonomy in the 
sense that they can in principle be autonomously chosen, and many pur-
suits involve the cultivation of traits that systematically foreclose whole 
regions of autonomous choiCe by changing one's dispositions, or traits of 
character. (Becoming a thoroughly honorable person, for example, means 
that many options faced by someone with a more fluid character simply 
will not present themselves as live options in deliberation.) Unless we are 
prepared to say that all such foreclosures are incompatible with the level 
of autonomy required for a good life, we will have to acknowledge the le-
gitimacy of vocations into which people are willingly drawn and within 
which they are changed in such a way that the vocation becomes integral 
to their lives. It is evident from the history of modern philosophy that the 
attempt to remove the possibility or centrality of this sort of vocation to 
22 Or, of course, by reiterating the charges against, or against the necessity of, au-
tonomy. 
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the good life leads directly to a struggle with the problems of nihilism, de-
spair, and anomie that can only be solved (as Camus solved themf3 by 
showing that creative activity is an acceptable substitute for a vocation. 
Aesthetic value measures a good life, considered as an object, by the ex-
tent to which it has some superordinate aesthetic value. I say "superor-
dinate" here to emphasize the fact (which could as well be said of any 
other attempt at a unitary account) that the sort of aesthetic value at is-
sue is only the sort that could plausibly dominate moral rectitude, inner 
harmony, and all the other criterial goods, that is, the sort that might by 
itself be sufficient for a good life. It is fairly clear that making one's life a 
work of art or achieving some sort of narrative unity in one's life will not 
suffice unless one aims at a rather exalted form of art. A soap opera has 
narrative unity; there are forms of art barely discernible as works, or as 
art; there are works of art meant to be self-negating, repellent, or disgust-
ing. A life exhibiting such qualities may be a good one, in part because 
it has such aesthetic value, but I have not been able to find a way of de-
scribing such qualities as either necessary or sufficient for a good life. As 
for more exalted forms of art, three objections come to mind. First, they 
are artifacts in the most thoroughgoing sense imaginable. A whole life 
that exhibited such a degree of artifice would surely seem objectionably 
contrived. Second, the artificiality aside, it is not clear at all that we can 
justify (all-things-considered) a recommmendation that life be lived so as to 
make it high art. (Shall we say, "Go make a life like lago's"? or Desde-
mona's? or Medea's?) It seems very odd for a theory of the good life to 
recommend against making one's life good, and, of course, if it sorts aes-
thetically good lives by some other criterion (say the quality of conscious-
ness, or rectitude) and recommends only those that meet both criteria, it 
is no longer a unitary account. Finally, even if we were to take the bit in 
our teeth and recommend making life an exalted work of art, to whom 
could we reasonably give such advice? Who is capable of carrying it out? 
And what will we say of the failures?24 In short, life as a work of art 
seems a nonstarter. 
What about beauty, and sublimity?25 Is a beautiful life necessarily a 
good one? The temptation to say so is dependent, it seems to me, on the 
claim that a beautiful life necessarily realizes many of the goods described 
in the other criteria: inner unity and integrity, excellence of a kind, mean-
23 See esp. Albert Camus, The Rebel (1951; reprint, New York: Vintage, 1956). 
24 An artist once remarked, overhearing a spectator's outrage at a silly piece in the Hirsh-
horn Museum, that at this museum of modern art, people are often angered by the failures 
they see, but that at the Air and Space Museum they find the failed flying machines hi-
larious. ' 
25 Nobility, which might also be thought of in aesthetic terms, is probably best treated 
under the exemplification of goodness-of-a-kind. Integrity, which can also be brought un-
der the heading of aesthetic value in various ways, is probably better regarded as an alto-
gether separate candidate. In my view, it fails as a unitary account for reasons parallel to 
the ones I note for beauty and sublimity. 
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ingful activity, meaningful necessity, or (sometimes) an exalted state of 
consciousness and/or moral rectitude. Suppose, as a rough approxima-
tion, we give something like the following analysis. To say that a life is 
beautiful is to say (a) that perception or contemplation of it is both pleas-
ant and attractive, that is, that to experience a life as beautiful is to have 
certain affective responses to one's cognition of it; and (b) that the nature 
of the life as a whole as an object-is the cause of our pleasure in it and 
attraction to it; and, more particularly, (c) that the cause of our pleasure 
and attraction lies in the fact that the life embodies a combination of aes-
thetic properties such as unity, completeness, fullness, magnitude, nar-
rative form, originality, uniqueness, balance, simplicity, purity, 
variability, contrasts (internal and against a ground), fittingness, propor- I 
tion, profundity, memorability, immediacy, transcendence, excellence of 
execution, difficulty of execution, and fragility. Then suppose a sublime 
life is defined as one that has a terrible or dangerous or awesome beauty. 
The question, then, is whether any sort of beauty. or sublimity defina-
ble in these ways (or plausible alternatives) can credibly be either neces-
sary or sufficient for a good life. If it is true that rectitude and perhaps 
autonomy are necessary conditions, then beauty or sublimity obviously 
cannot be sufficient. If (as seems highly probable) any combination of 
other criteria, absent aesthetic ones, is sufficient for a good life, then 
beauty or sublimity is not necessary either. (Think of trying to defend the 
thesis that an ugly little life, characterized by right conduct, personal 
achievement, personal fulfillment, meaningful opportunity, meaningful 
action, and meaningful necessity, is not a good one. Rule out the trans-
parently ad hoc attempt to argue that no such life could be ugly or little.) 
In short, it seems plausible to go only this far: that beauty or sublimity 
can be fundamental and sufficient for a good life when (enough) other 
goods are realized through it. That modest result, however, falls far short 
of the claim that one could plausibly advance a unitary account of the 
good life in terms of such aesthetic values. The same is true of integrity. 
A unitary account based on rationality measures a good life by the ex-
tent to which one's plans and choices are the product of rational deliber-
ation. The idea here is not to unify reason and other elements of action 
in order to achieve inner harmony, nor is it to require only that a life in 
principle be rationally justifiable (though perhaps lived out impulsively, 
or passionately, or through habit). Rather, the idea is to make rational de-
liberation a necessary and sufficient condition for a good life, and to or-
ganize a unitary account in terms of it. 
Rawls has given such an account. 26 For him, a "person" is an individ-
ual life lived according to a plan. If the plan is rational, and if one has 
drawn up such a plan under favorable circumstances and believes one-
self to be "in the way of realizing it" with good prospects of success, then 
26 Rawls, A Theon; of lustice, ch. 7. 
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one is happyY A plan is rational if and only if it meets the conditions 
for rational choice and would be chosen under conditions of full deliber-
ative rationality. The principles of rational choice are those of finding ef-
fective means, choosing the more over the less inclusive good, and 
choosing the goods with greater over lesser likelihood of realization. 28 
The conditions of full deliberative rationality are full information, careful 
consideration under favorable circumstances, awareness of the genesis of 
wants and desires, and the application of rational choice principles with 
particular attention to (a) a whole-life frame of reference, (b) no discount-
ing for the future, (c) the advantages of rising expectations throughout 
life, (d) the consequences of the" Aristotelian" principle that" other things 
equal, human beings enjoy the exercise of their realized capacities ... 
and this enjoyment increases the more the capacity is realized, or the 
greater its complexity," and (e) a concern for continuity, unity, and a 
dominant theme in one's life. 29 Summarizing, Rawls says: 
The guiding principle [is] that a rational individual is always to act 
so that he need never blame himself no matter how his plans finally 
work out. Viewing himself as one continuing being over time, he can 
say that at each moment of his life he has done what the balance of 
reason required, or at least permitted. Therefore any risks he as-
sumes must be worthwhile, so that should the worst happen that he 
had any reason to foresee, he can still affirm that what he did was 
above criticism. 30 
Note that rationality is proposed solely for its instrumental value in pro-
ducing a whole life that is both just31 and as full of goods (other than ra-
tionality) as it can be. Unless rationality yields these things it is not 
defensible as a unitary account. Whether rationality of the sort described 
yields moral rectitude is a much disputed point. Suppose it does, and that 
it yields only rectitude, not pleasure, or inner unity, or achievement, or 
something else. Then if rectitude is sufficient for a good life, rationality 
will be. But the sufficiency of rectitude is questionable. Suppose, then, 
that in addition to rectitude, rationality yields important goods described 
in the list of criteria: unity, for example, and peace of mind, a variety of 
pleasures and achievements, excellence. Then it seems that the plausibil-
ity of this unitary vision of the good life rests on the extent to which we 
can be confident that the persistent, thorough deliberation rationality re-
27 Ibid., p. 409. 
28 Ibid., pp. 411-16. 
29 Ibid., pp. 416-33. Quoted material is from p. 426. 
30 Ibid., p. 422. 
31 Rawls believes, of course, that rationality will give the right priority over the good, and 
presumably yield a life-plan that is just as well as good. This implies that for any account of 
the good life based on this notion of rationality, right conduct will be a necessary component. 
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quires will not be .self-defeating, that is, will not defeat the pursuit of ra-
tionally desirable goods that are necessary for a good life. This is 
comparable to the question of whether living on act-utilitarian principles 
will necessarily force one to cultivate traits of character (habits of thought 
and conduct, dispositions) that gradually diminish the extent to which 
one is able to apply the utilitarian principle, even at the most abstract 
level. 
I suggest that rationality is self-defeating in this sense. After alt it rec-
ommends something like Rawls's full deliberative rationality as a way of 
Me. 32 I submit that, under all but the most reduced circumstances, it is 
rational to cultivate dispositions regarding mutual love, risk, personal 
achievement, integrity, and perhaps aesthetic values and unity, which 
will grow, become self-reinforcing, and gradu:ally erode the extent of the 
areas of life in which one is prepared to deliberate seriously (that is, as be-
tween live alternatives) and the extent to which one is willing to count a 
life free of rational regret sufficient for a good life. I imagine, in other 
words, that in a very wide range of life-circumstances it will be rational 
for us to cultivate deeply internalized commitments (to family, friends, 
institutions) which thereafter will typically block the pursuit of full delib-
erative rationality in important areas of our lives. Once we have acquired 
such commitments, we will no longer be able to pursue full deliberative 
rationality as a comprehensive way of life. Rather, we will find ourselves 
unwilling or unable to deliberate about some matters that, considered ob-
jectively, would be genuinely open questions. We will, for example, find 
ourselves saying, with Bernard Williams, that when we have thought 
about why we should save our families from death rather than save 
strangers in similar peril we have had one thought too many. 33 
V. THE BEST LIFE 
It might be objected that there is virtually nothing to be learned, at this 
late date, from a recital of the various ways in which a life may be said 
to be a good one. Philosophers have always acknowledged plural possi-
bilities for good lives. What has concerned them is finding the best one 
from among those possibilities the one sort of life that, given the req-
uisite abilities and favorable circumstances, we ought to strive for, all-
things-considered. That is the only unitary account of these matters worth 
having, and indeed the only one that philosophers who have considered 
32 If all it means to adopt rationality as an account of the good life is that a good life must 
be hypothetically justifiable in terms of full deliberative rationality, then the inquiry into the 
nature of such a life is equivalent to philosophical inquiry (as I understand it) into the na-
ture of the good life. 
33 Bernard Williams, "Persons, Character, and Morality ," in The Identities of Persons, ed. 
Amelie O. Rorty (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1976), p. 215. Reprinted in Wil-
liams, Moral Luck (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1981). 
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them deeply have tried to get. Nothing in what has been said so far pre-
cludes or even casts doubt on the possibility of getting a unitary account 
of the best life. My reply to this is a flat denial. At this late date, what a 
recital of the range of possibilities for a good life does above all else is to 
remind us of how preposterous it is to suppose that there is only one best 
sort of life. Each of the candidates for a good life has its own better and 
best versions, defined in large part by how completely other important 
goods are realized in it. When the candidates are defined so as to look 
their best, the contention that a life of personal fulfillment is either infe-
rior or superior to a life of human excellence, or achievement, or rational-
ity at a comparable level is barely worth considering. Consider how such 
forms of life can be compared: 
1. They can be ranked according to achievability and likelihood of suc-
cess on their own terms, but it is obvious that that is ~ fUnction of the cir-
cumstances in which they are pursued. The best, then, means merely the 
best under the circumstances. It does not seem plausible to suppose that 
only one form of life would turn out to have the "most likely to succeed" 
rating for all individuals under conditions defined broadly enough to 
cover most human lives. 
2. Forms of life can be ranked according to sustainability and self-suf-
ficiency, but that too is a function of circumstance. Every best version of 
a form of good life is vulnerable to disastrous misfortunes. (The sort of 
invulnerability recommended by Epictetus is arguably sufficient for a min-
imally good life, but hardly a plausible candidate for the best life possi-
ble for a stoic.) 
3. Forms of life can be ranked according to necessity, that is, according 
to their compatibility with all the things necessary for a good life, and 
their ability to guarantee those necessities. If it turned out that only one 
form of good life were genuinely compatible with all the necessary goods, 
then the best version of that form would necessarily be the best life. But 
I take it that the discussion of criterial goods and candidate definitions of 
the good life implies that all of the influential candidates are fully com-
patible with the necessities, at least in the sense that each defines a kind 
of life that is both good and achievable, in a fairly wide range of circum-
stances. As for the ability of each candidate to guarantee the necessary 
goods, that is a question of achievability and likelihood of success, which 
is, as already noted, a function of circumstance. 
4. Forms of life can be ranked in terms of preference, that is, in terms 
of which candidate is preferred by all or most suitably situated agents. 
The very persistence of the candidates described above, each apparently 
ranked by many thoughtful people as the best form of life, is evidence 
that this procedure will not yield a unitary result. Of course, the condi-
tions of choice could be rigged to force one candidate to the top. If ancient 
Athenian philosophers-the ones past forty, perhaps, with money and 
slaves - were the only voters, that would narrow the range considerably. 
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But that is not a worthwhile exercise. Turning the choice over to a Millean 
panel of experts34 is not likely to narrow the field. (Certainly Mill's liber-
alism is premised on the conviction that it will not.) Nor will it help to 
tum the choice over to hypothetical rational agents, unless they are de-
fined so schematically as to render the result uninteresting. (If I were not 
a particular person, in a particular time and place ... then ... ?) 
5. Forms of life can be ranked according to inclusiveness, that is, in 
terms of the quantity and quality of goods of diverse sorts that they can 
coexist with, make possible, create, or sustain. The diversity of criterial 
goods and the way in which most of them show up (in one guise or an-
other) in all candidate descriptions of the good life suggests that the best 
life will be replete with diverse goods. It will be one in which all the ne-
cessities, and as many as possible of the other criteria, are as fully real-
ized as possible. If it turns out that one of the candidates defines the sort 
of life that is the most inclusive in this way, it will be the best (in one im-
portant sense of "best"). Presumably, this idea could be tested by asking 
of each candidate in tum: (a) whether it is compatible with each of the 
criterial goods, considered separately, even though it may not be compat-
ible with all at once; and (b) whether, given favorable conditions and a 
dominant role in defining a life, it will typically generate all the necessary 
goods and a more robust set of goods overall than any other candidate. 
Given the length of the lists involved and the technical difficulties of 
the hypothetical comparisons to be made, there is no hope of carrying out 
this analytical task in a mere essay. And I am not aware of any more sus-
tained attempt to do it, or something like it. It appears to me that inclu-
sive accounts of the good life -typically proceed by picking just one 
candidate definition and showing that, under favorable condittons, a life 
lived in accord with it will be inclusive enough to fend off the obvious ob-
jections from advocates of other candidates. But we now have developed 
philosophical accounts of this sort for rationality, human excellence, right 
conduct, congruence, unity, and personal fulfillment. Taken together, 
these accounts constitute an argument for pluralism, and that is a result 
I am happy to let stand. 
Philosophy, College of William and Mary 
34 If indeed one could be convened. It is clear enough that people can have genuine "in-
side" experience of a succession of diverse ways of life. But it is not clear whether they can 
hold them all in mind in such a way that their preferences would be "expert." 
